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P A R T II.

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THE
A L L I E S
A N D
The Late Ministry
Defended against
F R A N C E,
And the Present Friends of *France*.

P A R T II.

Containing a Vindication of the Barrier-Treaty,
and of our Alliances with *Portugal*: With a
Particular Defence of our Faithful and Good
Allies the *Dutch*, from the Charges imputed
to them in the Management of their Part
of the War.

— *faderis rupto*
Hæc Batavum Regio atque omnis plaga Gentis Iberæ
Cedat Amicitia Gallorum, & Pacis iniqua
Dicamus leges, & alium in regna Vocemus?

Audiat hoc Genitor, qui *faderis fulmine* fancit!

The Second Edition,

L O N D O N:
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Price One Shilling.

THE
ALIENS

AND
THE
POLITICAL MINISTRY

By
William Johnson

PRICE
ONE SHILLING

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR BY
WILLIAM JOHNSON, 10, NEW BOND STREET, LONDON.

*The Allies and the late
Ministry defended against
France*

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WILLIAM JOHNSON

THE
ALLIES
AND THE
LATE MINISTRY
DEFENDED
Against FRANCE, &c.

Shew'd in the foregoing Part of t.
 Answer, That the Author of the *Conduct*
 of the *Allies* having laid down this Gene-
 ral Proposition for the Foundation of
 whole Pamphlet, *That no Nation was ever*
scandalously abused by Domestick Enemies, nor
vilely treated by Foreign Friends as ours has
 been, had endeavour'd to make good his
 opposition, by proving these Three Points.
 First, *That we had engag'd in this War against*
all manner of Prudence or common Reason: Se-
 condly, *That we had pursued the War in a wrong*
Method, and had made no Efforts where we cou'd
not have weaken'd the Enemy: And Lastly,

A

That

That we had suffer'd our Allies to break all their Treaties and Agreements.

The First of those Points, That it was wrong for us to begin the War in the manner we did, he took very great Pains to demonstrate, as I have already shewn: And he pretended further to prove, That we were not oblig'd by the Terms of the Alliance to insist upon the Restitution of Spain.

I hope I have already confuted what he has offer'd upon those Two Heads; and have shewn at large to the Satisfaction of all who are truly in the Interest of their Queen and Country, and not in that of France and the Pretender, That as it was just and necessary for us to enter into the Grand Alliance; so by the Terms of that Alliance, which this Writer has most scandalously falsified, considered with other Parts of that Treaty, and explain'd by those made between Us and the Allies both before and after it, we are oblig'd to insist on the Restitution of the Spanish Monarchy, particularly of Spain and the Indies: And that if we were not by our Treaties so strictly oblig'd to adhere to these Demands, the Protection of our Trade, and the Security of the Succession in the House of Hanover, make it absolutely necessary we shoud insist upon them.

I proceed now to consider the other Two Points he mentions, That we have pursued the War in a wrong Method, and have suffer'd our Allies to break their Treaties. And since he himself has inverted the Order he laid down, and endeavours to expose the Faults of our Allies, before he represents the ill Management

ment of the War; I must be content to follow him; and to shew in the First Place, That the Conduct of the Allies has not been such as to forfeit the Right they have to our Performance of the Engagements we have made with them: After which I shall endeavour to justify also the Conduct of the Late Ministers, and to prove that the War has not been wrong pursued.

This Author indeed very frankly accuses the Allies of having broken every Article of their Treaties; and it is easy to guess why he does so. Such an Accusation was no more than necessary to defend the Treatment they have receiv'd from other People, in direct Violation of the Articles of a Certain Alliance.

But before this honest Gentleman enters upon Proof of this Point, he says he will take leave to offer a few Remarks on certain Articles in *Times of our Treaties*: One of them is the Barrier Treaty with the States made in October 1709. The other are our Two Alliances, Offensive and Defensive, with *Portugal*.

It might reasonably be thought, that the Treaties remark'd on are some of those Treaties, that are pretended to be broke; and yet upon Examination we shall find Two of the Three Treaties mention'd, can no way come into his Question. The *Barrier Treaty*, for example, concerns not the Operations of the present War: This therefore of all Treaties has nothing to do in this Place. But so' it does not affect the Proposition he is to prove, it serves his Purpose extremely, of railing at the *Dutch*, and ridiculing the late Ministers, and representing the Endeavours of

the last to establish a firm Union between the Two Nations, for their mutual Security, which is the justest and wisest Part any M--y can act, as a *Conspiracy* between them and the States to ruin *England*; tho' noth...g be more evident, than that in our *Preservation*, next our selves, they are most concern'd. As the bringing in this Treaty here is very absurd, and the Design of his doing so, horribly wicked and unjust, so the Remarks he makes on it, are extremely foolish and malicious; the Remarks of a Man who is entirely in the Interest of *France* and the Pretender; or else he could never vent himself with so much Rage against a Treaty made to secure, in the most effectual manner, the Q--'s Title, and the *Protestant Succession*, by obliging the *States* to insist on the *French King's* removing the *Pretender* out of his Dominions, and to support the just Right of the House of *Hanover* against all who shall oppose the Succession vested in them. And so reasonable and necessary a Treaty shou'd, methinks, with *Englishmen*, need no Defence. But since this Author has so grossly misrepresented it, and, in what he says, speaks not only his private Sense, but that of his *Faction*, I shall consider all his Objections to it; and that not so much for the sake of the Noble Person more immediately concern'd in making it, who is in a Situation to defend himself: But as the Treaty is of the greatest Consequence in it self; and as it highly concerns the Publick, that well-intentioned People shou'd be undeceived, and not easily suffer a Treaty to be reproached, on which their Security so much depends,

To come then to his Objections against the Substance of this Treaty. He tells us, p. 28. ' That neither Her Majesty, nor Her Kingdoms have any Interest or Concern in it, farther than what is mentioned in the Second and Twentieth Articles. By the former, the States are to assist the Queen in defending the Act of Succession; and by the other, not to treat of a Peace till the K. of France acknowledges the Queen, and the Succession of Hanover, and promises to remove the Pretender out of his Dominions. That is, in this Treaty neither the Q. nor Her Kingdoms have any Interest and Concern, but what is the greatest Interest and Concern they can I think have in any Treaty: And no Man who has truly at heart the Q.'s Title, and the Protestant Succession, and knows the Mischiefs of Popery and Arbitrary Power, and the restless Endeavours of France to bring them on us, can without Surprise and Concern, see this Writer treat with so much Contempt the Care that has been taken to secure these Points, especially when in the new Preliminaries the French King makes his Acknowledgment of the Q.—n, in such Words as give just Occasion for Distrust. And what makes it still more necessary to guard these Points all we can, is, that as justly as the Q.— possesses the Hearts of Her Subjects, yet it plainly appear'd by the French King's sending the Pretender with so small a Force on the last Invasion, that he thought there was then at least a great Party among our selves, always ready to assist the French in any Attempts they shall make against the present Settlement.

What

What then can this Writer mean by ridiculing a Treaty made for its Defence, as if a Matter of so much Importance could be too well secured? Whatever may be the Opinion of this Author, or his Friends, I must beg leave to tell him, the Nation have expressed themselves of another Mind. In 1708, both Houses of Parliament addressed the Queen, ' That for preserving the Repose and Quiet of Europe, and preventing the ambitious Designs of France for the future, She would be pleas'd to take care at the Conclusion of the War, to Continue and Establish a good and firm Friendship among all the Allies; and that the French King might be obliged to own Her Majesty's Title, and the Protestant Succession, as it is establish'd by the Laws of Great Britain; and that her Allies be engag'd to become Guarantees of the same.' And in Answer to this Address, the Queen was pleased to declare, ' She was of their Opinion in these Points; and assur'd them no Care should be wanting on Her Part to attain them.' So that what is done by the Barrier Treaty, was done in pursuance of an Address of Parliament, and in Execution of the Queen's own Sense express'd in her Answer to them. And will any Body now pretend that Points recommended by Parliament, and approv'd by the Crown, ought not to be pursued? Or make it a Crime in a Minister, that he has taken the most effectual Care of them, and has been the Instrument of enabling Her Majesty to make good Her Promise to Her People?

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But tho' he allows that the Queen and Kingdom have some little Interest in Two Articles of this Treaty, yet he is very sure, they have not the least Concern in any of the rest. But what does he mean by making this Assertion? Have Her Majesty and Her Kingdoms no Interest or Concern to prevent the Low-Countries from falling into the Hands of France? Why then did the Parliaments so long ago as in King Charles II's Time make frequent Addresses, and use all their Encouragement to engage that Prince to joyn in the Defence of those Countries? Sure this, as well as all we have been doing these 20 Years, sufficiently shew the constant Sense of the Nation on this Head: And how far this Consideration weigh'd with us and our Allies towards engaging the whole Confederacy in the present War, manifestly appears thro' the whole Term of the Grand Alliance, particularly in the 8th and 9th Articles. Of what Consequence also the Allies thought it, to have the Spanish Netherlands effectually secur'd from the Power of France, is very manifest from the 22th Article of the Preliminaries, which, with the above-mention'd Articles of the Grand Alliance, are the very Foundation of this Barrier Treaty. And therefore it is not to be imagin'd that any true Englishman who reflects upon the vast Expence of Blood and Treasure that has been spent during the Last and the Present War, in the Recovery of the Low-Countries, can ever think that Britain has no Interest or Concern in their Preservation; or that too great Care can be taken to prevent the like Charge on this Nation for the future.

But

But this Author wisely observes, ' That it is certainly for the Safety and Interest of the *States General*, that the Protestant Succession shou'd be preserv'd in *England*; and therefore he thinks this Treaty was quite unnecessary, and ought not to have been made. But sure this is a strange Conclusion: That which is the Reason why all other Treaties are made, is an Argument in this Writer's Opinion, that this should not be made. What has occasion'd all the Treaties that ever have been made, but the common Interest of the Parties contracting? And yet in case there is a common Interest, this Author thinks no Treaties need be made; nay, 'tis a Fault with him to make them. But he is further offended 'at the Price the Assistance of the Dutch is purchased at: And desires the World to judge, whether their Assistance to preserve a Right so well establish'd as the Queen's, be an Equivalent to those many Unreasonable, Exorbitant Articles in the rest of the Treaty.' We will now therefore see whether any thing in them be so unreasonable or exorbitant; which last Word has been so long fixed on *France*, by the Sanction of many Parl--ts, that no-body, but one who is in a *French* Faction, wou'd have taken it from those it belongs to, to apply it to our Allies, at least while the War lasts, tho' there were some Colour of Reason for it; which I shall shew there is not. The *Dutch* had a Right to their *Barrier*, previous to this Treaty. In the 5th Article of the Grand Alliance, it is expressly stipulated, ' That the Allies shall use their utmost Endeavours to recover the *Spanish* Nether-

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Netherlands, to the end they may serve as a
 Fence, Rampart, and Barrier to keep France
 at a Distance from the United Provinces, as
 formerly; the Spanish Netherlands, having been
 the Security of the States General, till the late
 seizure of them by the French King.—
 and in the 9th Article 'tis said, "That the Allies
 at a Treaty of Peace, shall agreed on what are
 the proper ways to secure the States General by
 the aforesaid Barrier". Pursuant to these
 Articles of the Grand Alliance, as the Towns
 in Flander, have been taken, the Dutch have
 constantly put Garrisons into them, with the
 consent of all the Allies; and for the same
 reason, in the 22d and 23d Articles of the
 Preliminary-Treaty, 'tis agreed, That as well
 the Towns which did not belong to the
 Crown of Spain at the Death of King Charles
 the 11th, as those that did, which France by
 those Articles was to deliver up, should be
 yielded and made over to the States, to serve
 their Barrier, and to be garrison'd by their
 troops; which Articles all the World knows
 were agreed to, and sign'd by the Ministers of
 late Emperor and King Charles, as well as
 those of England and the States. So that
 truth, by the Barrier-Treaty Her Ma-
 tity agrees to nothing more, than to
 pport the States in such a sufficient
 Barrier as had been yielded to them be-
 fore by all the Allies, under such Regula-
 tions as are necessary to preserve it, and are
 o way inconsistent with the Honour and
 Interest of Great Britain. For the Whole of
 this Treaty in few words is This: Her Ma-
 tity and her Kingdoms are highly concern'd
 that

that the French shou'd not be Masters of the Low-Countries. The States-General are likewise concern'd, That Her Majesty's Title be preserved, and the Protestant Succession shou'd be secure'd. 'Tis the mutual Interest of Both Nations, that these Two Points should be preserved in the best Manner, against the Danger both are in from the Power of France; which by what has since happen'd, instead of being lessened, is like to be more Exorbitant than Ripever: And therefore nothing can be more necessary, than for the Dutch and Us to enter into the strictest Alliance for the Preservation of Both; which is the only way not only to provide for our mutual Safety, but to prevent a New War; as is set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

But he says. Page 59. 'The Twentieth Article is a natural Consequence that must attend any Treaty of Peace we can make, with France; being only the Acknowledging Her Majesty as Queen of Her own Dominions, and the Right of Succession by Her own Laws, which no Foreign Power has, or can have, any Pretence to dispute.' Wou'd one thin it possible a Man should affirm that the Twentieth Article is only an Acknowledgment of Her Majesty and of the Right of Succession, when he had himself told us, but the Page before, that this Article requires also, That no Peace shall be made with France, without a Promise to remove the Pretender out of his Dominions? And is this Promise nothing? Give us the Old Preliminaries with it, and I shall think it a very great thing; but in Company with

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he is pleased to make of it; nor that
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es not barely insist on an Acknowledgment
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own Laws; which general Expressions
very easy to elude; but on Her Majesty's
to the Crown of Great Britain, and on
Right of Succession in the House of Han-
to the said Crown, as establish'd by the
tient Article is fully to be acknowledg'd
rance as a Preliminary, previous to any
ary of Peace that shall be made. 'Tis not
to be a Consequence of one, which he pre-
is it naturally must be; remembering very
himself, but presuming, I suppose, that
rest of the World have forgot, that this
atural Consequence of any Treaty of Peace with
ce, was not a Consequence of the Reli-
Treaty, and that every one of the
ars insisted on in this Article were then
ected; and that neither the King's Title
the Crown, nor the Right of the next
cessor Her present Majesty, were acknow-
g'd; nor was any Promise made to remove
Prerender. What Credit does an Author de-
, who in the Account he gives of a very
and plain Article, omits the most mate-
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not? since which Treaty, 'tis notorious the French King has denied the Queen's Title, own'd the Pretender, and assisted him to invade Her Kingdoms.

To come now to his Objections against those Unreasonable and Enormous Articles, which we granted the States in the rest of the Treaty. The First is, That by the Grand Alliance, Spanish Low-Countries were to be recovered and deliver'd to the King of Spain; but by this Treaty that Prince is to possess nothing in Flanders during the War. Here our Author misrepresents again, and affirms what is false; for it is no where said in the Grand Alliance, that Low Countries should be deliver'd to the King of Spain, much less that they should be during the War. And in fact, 'tis well known that for Years before this Treaty was made, the Government of those Provinces since the Reduction of them, has been administered by the Queen and the States, with the Consent of the Emperor and King of Spain. So that those Provinces neither have nor will have been restored to King Charles during the War, tho' this Treaty had never been made, but to shew what Care is by this Treaty taken of King Charles's Interest, the Sovereignty of those Provinces both as to the Civil and Ecclesiastical Rights, is expressly reserv'd to him, as well in those Towns where the Dutch are to have Garrisons, as in those where they are to have none. The Military Command only being given to the States in the Towns to be garrison'd by their Troops.

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After a Peace, our Author says, the States are to have the Military Command of about 20 Towns, with their Dependancies, and 400,000 Crowns a Year from the King of Spain to maintain their Garrisons; by which means they will have the Command of all Flanders from Newport to Namur, and be entirely Masters of the *Pays de l'Escaut*, the richest part of those Provinces.

In Answer to this Objection, I must tell this Writer, that he ought to have distinguish'd between those Towns in this Barrier, which were in the Possession of the Crown of Spain at the Death of King Charles, and those that were not. Of which last only, and their Dependancies, the States are to have the Revenues, with the Additional Sum of 400,000 Crowns a Year, for maintaining the whole Barrier. And whoever considers the Number of Troops that will be requisite for maintaining the whole Barrier; the vast Expence of repairing and keeping up the Fortifications; and of supplying those Places with all Warlike Necessaries; as also the Extent of the Country, of which only they are to have the Revenues; and will look back and see how little the whole *Low Countries*, when they were much richer and larger than they are now, even upon the Foot they were left at the *Pyrenean Treaty*, have been able to contribute for the Defence of their Frontier, must be convinc'd that what is allotted by this Treaty can by no means suffice; and the Dutch must ever and above bear a very great Expence, in which nothing but the absolute Necessity of Self-Preservation cou'd have engag'd them.

But

But to bring the Danger of this Treaty home to us, this honest Man, Page 40, observes, 'further, that they have Liberty to garrison any Place they shall think fit in the said *Low Countries*, whenever there is an Appearance of War; and consequently to put Garrison into Ostend, or where else they please, upon a Rupture with England.' The Representation of the Treaty in this Article is as unfair as the rest, and his Inference from it is ridiculous. For first, the Case he puts, of a Rupture with England, is an absolute Dissolution of this Treaty, the Design of which, as is express'd in the Preamble, is the mutual security of the contracting Parties; and therefore nothing can be construed to come within it, that supposes a Rupture between them; and the declared Intention of the Partier, is to defend the States from France, and others, who shall attack or endeavour to surprize them. And in the 7th Article, where this Liberty is given to the States, 'tis only in Case of an *apparent Attack in War*. Now from these Words, 'tis plain, First, That the States have no Right to this Liberty, where they are Aggressors, but when they are attack'd. Secondly, This is chiefly with a View to France, against whose sudden Insults, Experience shews, the States can't be too much on their Defence. And if *any* are joined wth France, 'tis for a very evident Reason, because by the Intrigues of France, some of their Neighbours upon the Continent may be drawn in to arm against them, as has hap- pen'd in former Wars, and may therefore do again. But as for England, a Rupture between

us and the States, is, as I have observed, out of the Question ; 'tis what I hope will never happen, unless the wicked Delights, of which this Author gives us scurvy Intimations, should prevail. And shou'd there be a Rupture, I scarce believe we should go to Flanders to attack them ; that is a visionary Scheme of making War, which never did nor can take place, unless under the malignant Influence of some very wretched Politicians. And if we were to be so mad, this Article could not hurt us, since the Treaty would then be at an End : and if we do not break with Spain at the same time, 'twill be impossible for the Dutch to put Troops into Ostend ; since this is one of the Places, which by the Treaty are entirely left in the Hands of the King of Spain, to be garrison'd by him.

The next Objection against this Treaty is, That the Dutch will in effect be entire Masters of all the Low Countries ; may impose Duties, Restrictions in Commerce, and Prohibitions at their Pleasure ; and in that fertile Country may set up all sorts of Manufactures, particularly the Woollen, by inviting the disengaged Manufacturers in *England*, and the French Refugees, who are scatter'd all over *Germany*. Now all this Objection is so false and groundless, that it is below an Answer, were it not in appearance very popular, contriv'd to incense the People of *England* against a Treaty made with no other View than to add a farther Security of that invaluable Blessing the *Protestant Succession*, and prevent, as much as may be, their being again engaged in a New

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War upon so expensive and burthensome a Foot, as we have been in This and the Last. By what has been already laid, it appears, that the Civil Power, with all Rights and Priviledges belonging to it, is expressly, and particularly reserved by this Treaty to King Charles, and consequently the Dutch cannot impose Duties, Restrictions, and Prohibitions, or Regulations in Trade, even in those very Places that are to be garrison'd by the States, as this Author would insinuate; and supposing the Fact to be as He represents it, yet the dreadful Consequence he draws from it, would never follow, of the Dutch establishing Manufactures in that Country: This is manifest from the effectual Care that *Amsterdam*, *Harlem*, *Leyden*, and the other Trading Towns in *Holland* take to prevent even those Places that have belong'd to the Generality ever since the Treaty of *Munster*, from sharing with them in the Manufactures. And should the disobliged Manufacturers in *England* go and settle in the Towns of *Flanders*, they would find themselves as ill treated in that respect, as they can be in their own Country; and all the other Imaginary Consequences, which this Writer draws from these new Manufactures, being without Foundation, must fall with them.

The last Objection against the Conveniency of this Treaty is, 'That all the Ports in *Flanders* are to be subject to the like Duties the Dutch shall lay upon the *Scheld*, which is to be closed on the Side of the States. Thus all other Nations are in effect shut out from trading with *Flanders*.' Yet in the very

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same Article 21a said, 'That the States shall
' be favoured in all the Spanish Dominions, as
' much as Great Britain, or as the People most
' favoured.' Who now would not from this
Representation think, that some New, and
all now Unheard-of Advantages were by
this Article given to the Dutch, and strange
Hardships put upon the poor English? Which
yet is not only groundless, but most impu-
tiently false: For 'tis nothing but stipulating,
that Matters relating to Commerce, should
be put upon the same Foot they were before
the War. 'Tis needless to repeat, that the
Dutch have no Right by this Treaty, to lay
on any Duties or Impositions, that being a
Part of the Civil Power reserved by the Tre-
aty to King Charles; and consequently no
Right to shut out any Nation from trading in
Lenders. The Article he finds fault with, is
made in pursuance of the 8th and 9th Ar-
ticles of the Grand Alliance, and on purpose
to prevent all Jealousies and Disputes be-
tween the Dutch and us, in relation to Trade.
And the several Clauses of it are formed on
the 14th, and Three following Articles of the
Treaty of Münster, in which the Commerce
of the Low Countries, and the rest of the Spa-
nish Dominions is settled: And according to
which is continued to be regulated till the
Death of King Charles. And to the Foot it
as then upon, the aforesaid Articles of the
Grand Alliance refer: So that all the terrible
Innovations here insinuated, are as old as the
Treaty of Münster, and of no less than 60
years standing. Now for avoiding all Dis-
putes between the Two Nations on this
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Head, and in pursuance of the Grand Alliance, the Queen and the States do by this Article not only engage to preserve Commerce upon the same Foot; but likewise promise that the Subjects of each shall be treated alike, and as favourably as those of any other Nation, in all Parts of the Spanish Dominions: And if Mr. Stanhope, as is suggested in this Book, has concluded an Advantageous Treaty of Commerce with Spain, we are in a fair way of enjoying the Benefit of it jointly with our Allies, pursuant to this and former Treaties, and to the Exclusion of the French; unless this Author's Friends succeed in their destructive Design of persuading us to give up Spain and the West Indies to the House of Bourbon. By such a Treaty, indeed we shall be in a worse Condition, as to our Trade, and every thing else, than before the War began. But to say that we are so by this Barrier Treaty with the Dutch, is, as I have shewn, utterly false. We have conquer'd Flanders for our selves, as well as for them; and by this Treaty our own Trade is re-established, as well as theirs: They have no one Advantage more than they had before the War, nor we any one less. And consequently the Guarantee of the Queen for this Treaty, is not unreasonable: All the Interests secured by it are mutual, and 'tis fit the Obligation shou'd be so too.

What now can be the Meaning of such violent Anger against so important a Treaty? What the Design of so many malicious Objections, when there is no Ground for any one of them? There can be but two Reasons for this very perverse Malice. It must either be with a

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iew to the Preceder, or an ill Peace; one or
oth are at the Bottom of this black Design;
he does indeed give us, as I have observed
in the first Part, broad Intimations of the
first; as in other Parts of his Book, so parti-
cularly in what he says of this Treaty, P. 39.
which he rails at for having 'put it out of the
Power of our own Legislature to change our Su-
bissions without the Consent of the Guarantees;
if this be the Consequence of it, I thank
the Author for the Discovery; 'tis the best
I have heard a great while, and makes
value the Treaty much more than I did
more. Yet why this Intimation, that there
n be any Occasion for such a Change?
hy so many Intimations that we may have
War with the Dutch? And how come these
brought into his Head, before we are at an
d of our War with France?
But if this Writer be not an Enemy to the
cession, which it is not very easy to believe,
d consequently That be not the Reason of
being so angry with the Barrier Treaty,
certain the other is; I mean that it ob-
structs the Design of an ill Peace. This is
certain one Reason, tho perhaps not the only
one, that he finds so much Fault with this
Treaty: For by such a Peace the Dutch Bar-
rier may be sacrific'd to some Private Articles
with the King of France, and Spain, and
the Indies be given up to his Grandson;
ut this is absolutely inconsistent with this
Treaty, and therefore right or wrong the
Treaty must be damn'd. 'Tis not very de-
cense in the Opinion of the most profittable
creatures of a Party, to violate a Treaty;

without first finding some Fault with it; and that is the Reason so much Artifice is us'd to lay down the Barrier Treaty, and to make us believe that our Succession does not want to be secured. But long would have thought that this Author, when he had injuriously levied against all Her Majesty's Allies, and scandalously abandon'd their Interest; when he had endeavour'd to persuade us to give up Spain and the West-Indies to the House of Bourbon, and had impudently recommend'd to us such Terms of Peace as no Prince, nor Monarch, nor Parliament, nor any one Ally had hitherto thought tolerable, nor the Enemy himself has presum'd to offer since the ~~Revoltes~~ Proposals were rejected; one would then thought, I say, that after all this he had made his Court sufficiently to France, and might have spar'd a Treaty so indispensably necessary for preserving the Religion and Liberty of his own Country. And it would have been hard to have found out the Reason that induc'd him to expose himself so far in making such a false and scandalous Representation of the Articles of this Treaty, if he had not oblig'd the World with the surprising New Maxim already mention'd, *That it is neither right in point of Policy or Good Sense, that a Foreign Power should be call'd in to confirm our Succession, &c.* But when he had really discover'd this Secret of his Heart, it was easy to account for all that he has written in this Pamphlet, for that he ever shall write whilst he lives. And as it was not possible for him to put a more Odious Case, than the bare Supposition of any Change in

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our Succession; so I am in no great fear
of that Change ever happening; unless
his Faction should clap up such a Peace
as would leave France in a Condition to en-
slave this Kingdom. In the mean time, till
such a Peace as that is made, and till the
French are in a Condition to force us, which,
whatever they are able, they will lose
no time in doing: I would humbly give
this Author a little Advice, That he may
be inform'd, That by endeavouring by any Overt-
Act whatsoever, to bind any Person who is enti-
tled to that Succession, he will find himself guilty
of High Treason. And now I will leave
him to enjoy the Comfort and Honour of his
Reflections upon this Treaty, and go on to
consider what he says to Those with Por-
tugal.

One at least of those Alliances had as little
Relation to the Point this Author was to
prove, as the Barrier Treaty; but since they
both stand equally in the way of an H^t Peace,
there was the same Necessity that both shou'd
be condemn'd. Yet if this Writer had told
us, what Circumstances Affairs were in at
the Time, of making them, we should
rather wonder the Portuguese could be prevail'd
on, upon any Terms, to quit the Alliance
they were in with France, than that we gave
them those we did. For, as this Author has
more than once told us, This War was begun
by the Change that was made in the Balance
of Power, upon the Seizure of the Spanish
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Monarchy, under such mighty Disadvantages, as gave very little Hopes, that the Allies could be long able to maintain themselves against so Exorbitant a Power, as France was then possess'd of. And had the Enemy been able to put as speedy and good an End to the War, as they were in a fair way to do a very few Months after these Alliances with Portugal were made, that King would soon have found Reason enough to repent his Breach with France, who would doubtless have made him feel in the severest Manner, the Effect of her Resentments. So that I really wonder, how the Fears of so great Danger could be overcome by any Offers we could make, much less by those we did, which in truth were the least that could be made. To which, if we add the Influence the French have in that Court, all who are competent Judges in these Matters, must confess, that these Alliances were the Effect of great Personal Courage and Resolution in the then King of Portugal, and of great Prudence and Dexterity in those that treated with him.

That the Terms granted on the Part of the Allies, are the least that cou'd be, we shall be convinc'd, by a short and plain Account of them. Both the Offensive and Defensive Alliance were made at the same Time, and sign'd the same Day, May 16. 1701. The First consists of 29 Articles, the other of 26: In the First 'tis agreed, That for the Land Service, and the Invasion of Spain on that Side, the King of Portugal shall maintain, at his own Expence, 15000 Men, and raise

13000 more to be paid by the Allies: And so this Body of Portuguese Troops, the Allies are to join 12000 Men of their own, or other Nations. This is the Substance of the 16 First Articles, the Two next, which are those that this Writer finds so many Faults with, relate to the Sea-Service. In the First of them, the Maritime Powers oblige themselves to keep on the Coast of Portugal, a compact Number of Men of War to defend their Ports, and protect their Trade, of which this Author is very witty upon, and calls, the Honour of being Companys and Guards in ordinary to the Portuguese Ships and Coasts. Then follows, That upon certain Advice or Intelligence, (cognovit etiam intellectus) that the Enemy intend to invade them with a Force Superior to what the Allies shall have on their Coast, at the Time of such Intelligence, that then the Allies shall increase their Number of Ships, so as to be able to prevent such Invasion: And to guard against any sudden Insults, such Ships shall continue in those Seas or Ports, as his Portuguese Majesty shall judge necessary. In the next Article, they oblige themselves, for the Defence of the Portuguese Dominions beyond the Seas, that if War be made upon any of them, or the King has certain Advice it is design'd, (cognovit) to furnish the Ships necessary to prevent or oppose the Enemies Designs: And if any strong Place be taken from them, to continue their Assistance till 'tis retaken. What now is there in these Articles unreasonable for the Portuguese to ask, or for the Maritime Powers to grant? I woud fain know, if this Author

himself had been to transact this Affair, how he cou'd have had the Face to ask the King of Portugal to break with France, and expose himself to the Invasions of so great a Power both by Sea and Land, which he was himself in no Condition to make Head against, without offering among other things to protect him from the Naval Strength of France, by keeping a Squadron on his Coasts? And to increase that Squadron upon Notice of a design'd Invasion? And who is the proper Person for this Notice to come from, but the King himself? Sure Princes ought to be allowed to have the quickest and best Intelligence of the Enemies Design against them, or else they are very ill served. Can this, without the greatest Distringent, be called, taking the King of Portugal's Word, when he has a Fancy he shall be invaded? Or when he is in a Humour to apprehend an Invasion? Where did he learn, that Fancy or Humour are the English for *comptos intellectu et cognitio*, the Words used in the Original? Are not these Words strong enough to guard against Fancies or Suspicions only? Don't they suppose certain Knowledge or Advice? And can't the King of Portugal, if he has such certain Advice, convince our Admirals, that 'tis not a Humour or a Whim, but sure Intelligence and well-grounded, that he goes upon? Besides, is not this a pretty Character of a Prince in Alliance with us, to suppose we can't judge of the Intelligence he has? that *Fancy* and *Fancy* govern him instead of Reason and Knowledge, in Matters of the most consequence? But whether they do or not, our Admirals

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Admirals must be as great Fools as the Prince himself is supposed to be, or else they will be able to distinguish between Things so ver
y different as a groundless Fancy and cer
tain Advice: And if they are satisfied there is nothing in what is apprehended, they won't run upon his Errands, notwithstanding any thing in these Articles. But if this Au
thor still thinks the Words us'd in the Tre
aty are not strong enough to prevent the Ca
prices and Humours of the King of Portu
gal, I desire he would tell us what are, and how he would have express'd himself on this Occasion? There is indeed the word *suspicio* in the Second Article of the defensive Alli
ance, but the Occasion 'tis used upon, won't serve this Author's purpose: 'Tis this, If the Kings of France or Spain have a design to make War on Portugal, or if there be such a *Suspicion*: *Si velint, aut eos velle suspicio fit, bellum inferre*, then the Maritime Powers shall. What? -- send Fleets and Armies? No, but interpose their good Offices to preserve Peace and prevent a War. This is all they are ob
liged to do upon a bare Suspicion. When the Allies are to do more, 'tis upon certain Advice, express'd in the Words above-menti
on'd.

But another Thing that offends our Author in these Two Articles, is something that in Truth is not in them, but in the Two next: and that is, that these Fleets must be subject not only to the King, but his Viceroys, Admirals, and Governors; which he believes is an Indignity that will never offer'd before, except to a conquer'd Nation. Does he himself believe this? Or would

he only have others believe this to be a great Indignity, when indeed 'tis none at all, but absolutely necessary, to make our Ships of Use to the Prince whose Dominions they are to protect? The Substance of the first of these Articles is this, That *all Auxiliary Ships* (not Fleets, as this Author calls them) shall be subject to the King's Orders; and in Parts beyond Sea, to the Orders of his Viceroy's, and Governors. That is, to the Persons that have the Supreme Command, in the Parts where these Ships are to be employed. And if it be reasonable they should be subject to the King's Orders when they can be had, 'tis for the same Reason fit that where they cannot, these Ships shou'd be subject to those who govern in his stead, and have his Authority. Such an Article is absolutely necessary to prevent Disorders and Disputes, which might otherwise arise, and render the Service of our Ships useles; the Consequence of which wou'd be, that we shou'd be at all the Expence of assisting our Ally, and yet he wou'd not be the better for it. But what is necessary to make an Alliance useful, can with no fairness be said to be an Indignity: Nor is this Author so little acquainted with Treaties, as not to know that in Alliances between Crown'd Heads, the Succours sent by either Side to the other have always been esteem'd *Auxiliaries*; which is the Name given to our Ships both in the 18th and 19th Articles; and have been under the Direction of the Prince, to whose Assistance they were sent, and have on that Account given Rank without any Difficulty to the others, as Principals in the War.

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And yet 'tis for this, which is the constant
Practice in the like Cases, that so much Clai-
mour is made against what is contain'd in the
19th Article, That when these Auxiliary Ships
are joined with the Portuguese Fleet on any
Occasion, they shall receive the Signal from
their Admiral; that Councils of War shall be
held on Board him, and Orders to execute what
has in those Councils been resolved on, shall be
sent to the other Commanders from him: This is
all the Subjection that is require'd to the Por-
tuguese Admirals. And I would be glad this
Author wou'd give us a more reasonable
Scheme, in the like Case, that shall promote
the intended Service better, or have in it less
Indignity, or more Order. Till then, I must
take the Liberty to say, That all he has urg'd
against these Four Articles, is false, malici-
ous, and absurd. Whatever is agreed in them
on the Part of the Maritime Powers, is ne-
cessary to answer the Ends of the Alliance; the
least that Portugal could ask, and no way
inconsistent with the Honour of Great Britain.
And if we look into Facts, to see what ill
Use the King of Portugal has made of the
Power given him by these Articles, or what
Hardship has been put upon our Fleets; we
shall find the whole amounts to this; That
Two Men of War went once to Brazil, and
Three or Four more have at other Times
waited the Return of the Brazil Fleets; and
put themselves under the Command of the
Portuguese Admiral or Commodore. And I
suppose this Author does not want to be told,
that our Interest in those Fleets would make
it very reasonable for us to do so much for
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their Safety, tho' we were not obliged to it by the Treaty; the whole of which, as to these Articles, comes to this: The King of Portugal can't be brought off of his Alliance with France, without a Promise from the Maritime Powers to protect his Dominions upon the Continent and in the Indies. This Protection can't be given but by our Fleets; our Number of Ships must be proportion'd to the Occasion there is for them; which Occasion, the Prince or his Viceroy's whose Assistance they are design'd for, are the best Judges of; and therefore they must, to be useful to him, be under his or their Orders; and when any of them are in Conjunction with his Fleet, they must, as the Nature of Auxiliaries requires they should, be under his Admiral, so as to receive the Signal from him, &c. And to make the Protection promised effectual, the Number of these Auxiliary Ships must be increased upon any Invasion from the Enemy, with a Force superior to our ordinary Strength; and this Increase must be made, not when the Invasion is actually putting in Execution; that, 'tis plain, will be too late; it must be, while the Enemy are making Preparations for it, and before they are finished. When there is not only a Suspicion, or uncertain Rumours of such Preparations, but certain Advices, and such Intelligence as may be depended on, 'tis then sure high time to take Care of the Interests of the Prince whom we oblige our selves to protect, and provide for his Safety, or the Safety of his Dominions, by Preparations suitable to the Occasion, and by such an Increase

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crease of Strength as the certain Designs of
the Enemy make necessary. And, as the
King is to be presumed to have the earliest
Notice of the Enemies Designs, and the best
Advices in what relates to his own Dominions,
those that come from him ought to be
in the first place attended to; and if there be
not good Reason to doubt of their Certainty,
ought to be complied with. Let this
Writer shew, that any Part of the Argument
here summ'd up, is unreasonable or un-
necessary; or that anything more is contain-
ed in the above-named Articles, than is in
this Argument: If he can prove neither of
these Propositions, it will follow, with the
utmost Evidence, that there is nothing grant-
ed in these Articles, but what is fit and neces-
sary; and consequently, that his Censures,
and Attempts to turn them into Ridicule, are
themselves very unjust and ridiculous.

In the Defensive Alliance, which is per-
petual, the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Articles re-
lating to our Ships, are almost in the same
Words, and therefore the same Answers will
serve to the Objections made to them. But
I must observe the Unfairness of this Author
here again, in not taking any Notice of the
8th Article, That if the Ships of the Three
Nations are to act in Conjunction, in any
Expedition which is the common Concern
of all of them, (and not particular to the
King of *Portugal*,) that then the Commander
that has most Ships under him, shall give the
Signal, and act in all respects as Admiral to
the whole. And in virtue of this Article,
'tis well known, that in 1705, Sir *John Leake*
had

had under his Command a Portuguese Flag with 7 or 8 of their biggest Ships, when he beat Point's Squadron in the Bay of Gibraltar.

While our Author is finding fault with this Defensive Alliance, out of his great Love of Method, and to say a very ridiculous thing, he goes out of his way to tell us, *That in the Offensive Alliance we took no care of having the Assistance of Portugal, whenever we should be invaded.* But in this it seems we were wiser; for that King is obliged to make War on France or Spain, whenever We or Holland are invaded by either. Would not any one think by these Words, that a great Oversight had been committed in the Offensive Alliance, but that afterwards by some Accident or other we were made sensible of our Mistake, and corrected it in a Second Treaty? And yet this Insinuation is so false, that Both Treaties were made together, and sign'd the same Day, as I have already observed; and therefore there was no need of making Provision in the Offensive Treaty, in case either of the Maritime Powers were invaded; that Case was proper for the Defensive Alliance, and to that it is reserved. And by this Treaty, as we are to send to the King of Portugal's Assistance 12000 Men, if he be invaded, and to protect his Dominions with our Ships, as in the Offensive Alliance; So, if either of the Maritime Powers are invaded, he is by the 12th Article to make War on France or Spain with his whole Strength, *am Universis Viribus suis*: And therefore 'tis false to say, 'That by the 13th Article we are told what this Assistance

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stance is which the Portuguese are to give us, that they are to furnish Ten Men of War: As if making all the Diversion they can by Land, were not as truly giving Assistance, as furnishing these Men of War; especially when this Author tells us they are to serve only upon their own Coast: Tho that again is another Falsity, as it intimates that they are by the Treaty to serve no where else: For by the last Clause in the 13th Article, 'tis stipulated, that if War be made by France alone, then these Ten Portuguese Ships shall, to assist the Maritime Powers, act in Conjunction with their Fleets. But this Clause 'twas for the Purpose of this very sincere Writer to omit; as also the Reasons given in the Article, why in the other Cases, of the War being made by France and Spain together, or by Spain alone, the Portuguese Ships shall serve only on their own Coasts, *quod in ea versante* *ad distractandas Hostium vires plurimum proficiat*; they would by that means be able to do the Common Enemy most Mischief. Which is good Reason. And notwithstanding our Author's no doubt they will there be of mighty Use to their Allies, and Terror to the Enemy, all whom Experience has taught to reflect with any Judgment upon these Matters, will allow, that any Assistance Portugal could give the Maritime Powers, might be employ'd much more to their Service, by keeping near Home, and making what Diversion they can, than by coming to join either the Dutch or us. And as the same Strength wou'd then be prepar'd with much less Expence, they would be able to employ more Strength in a Diversion

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a great deal; than they cou'd send to us, and
wou'd be in a Condition to continue it longer.

But there is one thing this Author makes a
great Jeal of, and that is, that by this Treaty,
if we or Holland are invaded, yee if we ex-
pect any Assistance from the King of Portugal
we are to supply him with Ships and Forces in the
same manner, as if he were invaded himself. And
tis, in his Opinion, must needs be a very pru-
dент and safe Course for a Maritime Power to take
upon a sudden Invasion; by which, instead of ma-
king use of our Fleets and Armies for our own De-
fence, we must send them abroad for the Defence of
Portugal. What now can be more frivolous
than this Objection? Can we expect, when
there is such a Disproportion in the Parties,
the Assistance should be equal on both Sides?
If a Diversion on the Side of Portugal shall
be thought at any time of Service to us
shou'd we not make such an Addition to their
Strength, as may enable them to do it effectu-
ally; which from their own single Force is
not to be expected? And if upon an Invasion,
we think it more to our Purpose, to keep
our Men and Ships at home, is it not in our
own Power, notwithstanding any thing in
these Articles? Does our Author think, that
when we are invaded, the King will from
these Articles insist upon our defending our
selves, in the worst manner, by sending our
Troops to him, when 'tis more for the Service
of his Allies to keep them at home? Such
Cases speak themselves, and need no other
Answer. But if our Author would have
Portugal make some extraordinary Efforts of
themselves, so wou'd I too; but both He and

I know

I know they cannot. And that is the sum Reason the Dutch have not continu'd to perform their Part in the First of these Alliances. For the Second, as I have before observ'd, don't properly take place yet; nor can well till this War is at an End. And if we have kept closer to our Articles, I shall shew, & was, because we thought it worth our while. So particular an Examination into these Alliances, will I doubt not convince every Impartial Reader, that the Weakness and Folly they are accused of, is not in them, but in the Objections made to them. Which, as they are groundless and unjust, separately consider'd, and by themselves; so they are summ'd up by this Author, in this very false Conclusion, that the Spirit and Tenor of these Treaties quite thro', run only upon this single Point, what we and Holland are to do for Portugal, without any Mention of an Equivalent; except those Ten Ships, which at the time when we have greatest Need of their Assistance, are oblig'd so to stand upon their own Coasts. I have shewn, that to fit out Ten Ships, is not the only Assistance; but that they are also to make the greatest Diversion they can by Land. Nor are these Ships confin'd to their own Coast, except when the War is made by Spain. And if they are then oblig'd to keep in their own Seas, 'tis the best Service they can do. And if what they are to do by Land and Sea for us, be not equal with what we are to do for them, 'tis no Objection, if they do in Proportion to their Strength. That by this Treaty they are engag'd to; and if they don't perform their Part, we are not, that I know of,

obliged to perform ours, if we don't think it for our Interest. From these mutual Engagements, 'tis plain, the whole Tenor of these Treaties don't run upon one Point only. And I must add, what this Author has a mind shou'd be conceal'd, that by the 19th Article of the Defensive Alliance, a very considerable Advantage is granted us, and the *Dutch*, by free Entrance into their Ports in Time of Peace, for Twelve Men of War; which is twice the Number that was allowed before.

From this Account, 'tis plain these Alliances want no other Vindication, than to be represented truly as they are. And one need only read the Articles themselves, to be satisfy'd, there is nothing in them, that an Englishman ought to be ashame of. But this is not enough: To do Justice to those Alliances, and to the Wisdom of those who advised the making them, we must look back to the Circumstances Affairs were then in, and the great Difficulties that were to be overcome; which I have already hinted together with the Advantages these Treaties gave us a fair Prospect of, with respect to the War, and the real Benefit we reap from them in our Trade. They who remember, how impatient the Nation were for these Alliances, before they were made: What Hope we had of reducing *Spain* to the Obedience of King *Charles*, by a vigorous Impression from that Side, on which *Spain* lies in a manner quite open to *Madrid*, and the inevitable Ruin not only of our *Spanish*, but the *Mediterranean* Trade also, that must have follow'd if the Port of *Lisbon* had continu'd shut to us,

must confess, that instead of Blame, great Thanks and Praises are due to the Majority that advis'd these Alliances; from which we had Reason to promise our selves such great Advantages in the Prosecution of the War, and without which the most useful Branches of our Trade cou'd not subsist. And had our Expectations from these Treaties, answer'd in both Points of *War* and *Trade*, which no body cou'd foresee they wou'd not, all the World must own, they had been worth great deal more, than what by the Articles of Favour of the Portuguese, we have given them. And after the Experience of Eight years, allowing the Portuguese have not perform'd some Articles in relation to the War, believe, if it were to continue, even the new M---y wou'd not advise the breaking of them. For are not the Advantages of our Trade with *Portugal* vastly an over-Balance for any Inconveniences we suffer, not from the Articles of these Alliances, but from the ill Execution of some of them? Much less are the distant Promises made to the Portuguese in these Treaties, in any Degree equal to the Benefit we have actually receiv'd from them. Is not the Treaty made with that Prince, at the End of the Year 1702. for the Admission of *English Cloth*, which stood then prohibited in *Portugal*, a far greater real Advantage to us, than any they can hope for from us? All the Manufactures of *Portugal* were immediately ruin'd by it; and both that Kingdom and their Dependencies in *America*, have ever since been forc'd to depend on us for their *Woollen Goods*. But

that is not all ; we have in effect carried on the Spanish Trade thro' them, and almost engrossed the whole return of Bullion from Brazil. Our Troops in Spain and Portugal have been chiefly paid by the Advantage of the Ballance of that Trade on our Side, without sending any Species from England : And that Ballance has been so great, that I will appeal to all the Money that has been coin'd in her Majesty's Mint, and even to the Custom-House Books, whether in Times of Peace the whole Spanish Trade has been equal to it. Will any body now condemn Treaties so very advantageous, and say they should not have been made, or should be broke ; because the Portuguese have not answer'd our Expectation in some other Points ; because their Finances are not perhaps well managed ; because some of their M—rs are not heartily in our Interest ; because they have not punctually perform'd the Military Part in their Treaties with us, nor manag'd their share of the War so well as they should and might have done ? Should we for these Reasons quarrel with those 'tis so much our Interest to be Friends with ? Shall we not for our own sakes hinder them from being swallow'd up by the Common Enemy ? Had the Dutch as much Interest as we in the Preservation of them, I am apt to think, they would readily have done much more towards it, in proportion to their Strength, than ever we have yet perform'd. But if these Alliances were so desirable for England, and at the time when they were made, seemed so very useful for the War, and have ever since really been of the

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greatest Advantage to our Trade; What can
be the meaning that this Author should so
grossly misrepresent them? Or how could he
expect such a Misrepresentation should pass
without a Discovety? The Answer to both
these Questions is very easy. The Reason
why this Author finds so much fault with
these Alliances, is the same for which he
is so angry with the Barrier-Treaty; both
stand in the way of an ill Peace, and
therefore must be broke into, to come
at it; and to justify the Violation of them,
both must at any rate be condemn'd as
weak and foolish Bargains. The Barrier
Treaty secures to the Dutch some Towns,
that by such a Peace are to be given back to
France, and the Alliances with Portugal are
inconsistent with leaving the Duke of Anjou
in Possession of Spain and the Indies; And
this is the true Quarrel this Author and his
Friends have against them; For in the 22nd
Article of the Offensive Alliance, 'tis agreed
That no Peace shall at any time be made, while his
most Christian Majestys Second Grandson, by the
Dauphin, or any other Prince of French Extrac-
tion, shall continuall in Spain. If our Author
could have reconciled his intended Peace
with this Article, we should have heard of
no Complaints against the Four preceding
ones. They are blam'd, but 'tis this provokes
him, and 'tis purely for this Reason he is so
much offended with the First Article of this
Treaty, That the Emperor and the Mar-
itime Powers shall jointly with the King of
Portugal endeavour, that King Charles (then
Arch-Duke) shall be put into Possession of
all

all Spain, as the King his Predecessor pos-
sess'd it. In which Article this wondrous
Man finds a World of Nonsense and Contra-
diction; because by the Grand Alliance the
Maritime Powers might conquer what they
could for themselves in the Spanish West-Indies;
And by a Secret Article in this very Treaty,
some Places both in Spain and the Indies are
to be given to the King of Portugal. But does
this Author really take his Readers to be such
Fools, as to think there is any Contradicti-
on in this, because he is pleas'd to call it so?
As to the first Objection, this Treaty was
grounded on the Grand Alliance, into which
as the Preamble sets forth, the King of Por-
tugal was invited by the rest; and that King
considering the Danger all Europe was in, by
the plain Indications the French King had gi-
ven, that he intended to make Spain a Pro-
vince to France, and that by his Treaties
with France he had only acknowledg'd the
Duke of Anjou as in Possession of Spain, but
not as having a just Title to it; upon these
and other Considerations he thought fit to en-
ter into this Treaty, to provide in the most effi-
cient manner for the Safety and Liberty of Spain,
and the Right of Succession to those Kingdoms. Is
this Treaty then an Entrance into the Grand
Alliance, at the Invitation of those who had
made that Alliance, and shall it nevertheless
be pretended, that any Articles or Clauses in
that Alliance are voided by this Treaty, made
in pursuance of it, unless they are expressly
revoked and declared void? Is not this Arti-
cle to be understood with such Exceptions as
are already made previously to it by the Par-
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ties concerned ? Was ever this Objection be-
fore started ? Do the Maritime Powers allow
their Hands to be by this Article tied up
from doing, if they think fit, what they are
allowed by the 6th Article of the Grand Alli-
ance ? Or has King *Charles*, or his Father, or
his Brother, ever pretended, that the Right
we had by that Article to what we shou'd
Conquer in the *West-Indies*, is taken away,
or given up by this ? What then does this
Author mean by these chimerical Contradi-
ctions, where no-body else has ever dreamt
of any ? There is no manner of Inconsisten-
cy between the Two Treaties, but one is
grounded on the other, and made to pursue
the Ends of it : And his other Objection, if
possible, is more ridiculous, *That we broke*
this very Article in Favour of Portugal, by sub-
sequent Stipulations. Is an Article of the same
Treaty, a *subsequent Stipulation* to that Treaty ?
Or is a Treaty contradictory to it self, be-
cause the Parties contracting for the Recov-
ery of the Whole Spanish Monarchy agree
by a Secret Article to give a small Part of it
to the Person they contract with for his As-
sistance ? Suppose Three Persons agree with
a Fourth for the Recovery of a great Debt,
and to engage him in it promise him, If the
Debt be recover'd, that he shall have such a
Share for his Pains : Would any Man in his
Senses say that one Part of this Supposition
is a Contradiction to the other ? Or that the
Agreement to recover the Whole Debt is
broke, because by the same Agreement a cer-
tain Share of it is to be given as a Reward
to the Person agreed with to assist in the Re-
covery ?

Slavery? But this is just no good Sense as what is urged in this Objection; which is truly new, and will, I dare say, be deny'd by nobody to be the Author's own. The Form of the Secret Article runs thus: 'Tis provided, That after the Right in Spain and the West-Indies shall be lawfully transfer'd to the Archduke, that he shall yield and give to the King of Portugal such and such Places in both for ever. What a mean Opinion has this Author of his Readers, when he triumphs with so much Insolence in his own Nonsense! They who were guilty of so much Folly and Contradiction, say he, knew best whereon it proceeded from Corruption or Stupidity. In Answer to which, I must be so just to this Author as to clear him of the Imputation of Stupidity. And if what he says proceeds wholly from Corruption, it ought to be consider'd that the Means used, and the Tools employ'd, should always be proper for the Cause to be maintain'd.

Which leads me to the other Question that may very well be ask'd, How this Author cou'd venture upon so gross a Misrepresentation of these Alliances, or expect they shou'd pass without a Discovery? Which needs no other Answer, than that his Cause made it necessary; and he that cou'd venture to corrupt Publick Acts in Print, and in every body's Hands; wou'd not upon Occasion scruple to misrepresent Papers that are not in Print, and hardly any where in Writing; it is very possible this Author and his Friends might think there was not in England a Copy of these Alliances but what was in their own Hands, and then that would prevent a Discovery.

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very of their soul Misrepresentations, or at
least, a solid Confutation of them; and if this
cou'd not be wholly prevented, if it cou'd but be
done it a while, and his thick-lid Lies cou'd but
for a few Days pass for Truths, and Influence
where they should, their Point was answer'd;
& Men who have no Reputation to lose, whom
the Cause is serv'd, would after that be very
indifferent, whether the Discovery were made
or not; any body might have their leave to
disprove their Lies, when they have no fur-
ther use for them.

But before I leave this Subject, I must ob-
serve, that these Alliances with Portugal, as
well as the Barrier-Treaty, being only in MSS.
an Enquiry into the Author of this Scanda-
lous Libel, would be brought into a very nar-
row Compass. 'Tis highly probable that there
is not above one Copy of either in hands that
would make such a use of them; and the
Reader will, I doubt not, think it much for-
the Honour of those, in whose Hands Her Ma-
esty's Treaties are, to corrupt them Thems-
elves, or to employ others in such wicked
and profane Work; I say profane, for
Treaties have been always reckon'd Sacred
Things; and the Reasons of State make it
highly fit they should be so reputed; since
Alliances are the Bonds of Union and Friend-
ship between Princes, without which they
can't support themselves. And if they are
uffer'd to be cramp'd on, and treated with
indignity, it reflects highly on the Honour
of the Princes that make them, and greatly
weakens their Authority at home, and un-
doubtedly creates Diffidence and Jealousy in

the Minds of their Allies. And for these Reasons I defy this Author, as well as he is vers'd in the History of England, to give one Instznce, when our Treaties with Foreign Princes, while the Prince that made them was on the Throne, and the Treaties in Force, were ever expos'd to the Contempt of their Subjects, in so publick and impudent Manner, and declar'd to be weak and foolish Bargains. This is a Glorious Instance of the tender Regard some Men have for the Honour of the Crown. For sure we are this notable Performance does not come from Men of any other Character.

But to proceed : After these choice Remarks of our Author upon Treaties, which I have shewn have no other Fault, but that they are an Obstruction to the Peace he and his Friends are so fond of ; and Two of them at least are no way concern'd in the Argument in hand ; he comes at last to the Proposition he was to prove, P. 42. but has strangely chang'd the Words of it : For instead of what they were proving, That we suffer'd each of our Allies to break every Article in their Treaties, which he undertook to prove, P. 21. and pretends his Author has prov'd, P. 58. here, P. 42. he propose to Darsb only, to consider in what manner our Allies have observed those Treaties they made with us, and if they did at several Stipulations and Agreements pursuant to the Number of them. And instead of shewing that each of us was not our Allies have broken each Article of their Treaties, he attacks in what follows, only the States were Emperor, the States, and the King of Portugal proportion and in all he says against the Two First, I found the

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Weight with impartial Men, in Articles they
don't see, after Two such very gross Cor
ruptions in the 8th Article of the Grand Al
lance, the only one he has given us at length.
He that can't be sincere, where 'tis so easy to
discover him, must not be trusted easily.
where 'tis not. And we shall find our Author
throughous true to his Character, in going
over the Charges he brings against each of
the Allies, who have the Misfortune to be
under his Displeasure.

To begin with the Dutch. The first Charge
against them, is, That whereas by a Convention
anc, but subsequent to the Grand Alliance, twas agreed that
Peace be and Holland should bring 60,000 Men into the Field
Two of them, Flanders, and England 40,000. There was
in the Argue a augmentation made by the Dutch and Us of
t to the Propo 60,000 Men for the Year 1701, upon a Par, di
but has strangedlly contrary to the former Stipulation. Now
For instead of that there was such an Augmentation made
of our Allies upon a Par, is true; but that this was con
trary, which contrary to the former Stipulation, is false; if the
Author means, that by the former Stipulation
the proposed Dutch were oblig'd in all future Augmen
tations to observe the same proportion they
our Allies but with us, and that at first. That Stipulation affected only
the Number of Men to be then rais'd, but
that was not a binding Rule any further. In all
of their Future Additions to the Army in Flanders, the
lows, only the rates were at liberty to insist upon a new
proportion between Them and Us, if they
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broke at all, but a new One made ; and all new Contracts, the Parties contracting may and ought to make upon the best Terms for themselves they can. The Dutch had made a great Effort at first setting out, and rais'd a Company above 60,000 Men, besides 45,000 they had in Pay before the War began. This was so heavy a Charge, that they soon found, they could not bear the Expence of taking more Troops into their Service jointly with England upon the first Foot. But to push the War with vigour, they were willing to make an Augmentation of 10,000 Men upon a Par. At the English Parl—t at that time being not very well pleas'd with the Prohibition of Commerce between Us and France, while the Dutch enjoy'd it, wou'd not agree to this Augmentation ; nor because it was upon a Par., so far as I remember, but unless the Dutch would prohibit Trade with France, as we had done. And this Difficultie had like to have hinder'd the Augmentation ; it being evident, that a People who subsist wholly by Trade, could not long bear such a Prohibition. However, the States, out of their Zeal to the Common Cause, agreed to submit to this Hardship for one Year ; but finding by Experience that it was impracticable, and that their People neither would nor could bear it, the Par—t was prevail'd with to continue the Augmentation without insisting on the Tack to it. This is the true State of the first Augmentation that was made.

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He says further, That the next and some en-
suing Campaigns, farther Additional Forces were
allowed, and in every new Supply the Dutch gra-
dually lessen'd their Proportions. But whoever
will give himself the Trouble to look into the
List of the Forces in the Dutch Pay, here-
unto annex'd, will find that the States made
several Additions to the Troops in their Ser-
vice, in which we bore no Share: And if
he will please to compare that List, which
is Authentick, with the Account given by
this Author, he will find, that nothing
can be more false, than to say, That in
every new Supply the Dutch "gradually less-
en'd their Proportions." As the First Aug-
mentation was made upon a Par, so at
least were all that have been made since for
that Service. There were indeed in the Year
1706, 1000 Palmine taken into the Service of
the States and us; of which we pay Two Thirds.
But these Troops, tho' put on the Flander-
Establishment, never serv'd there, but in Spain;
the Service there at that time requiring
it. Besides, in lieu of these, it appears
by the Lists of the Forces in the Dutch Pay,
that they increas'd their Horse against the
next Year with 8 Men in a Troop, amount-
ing in the whole to near 1200 Men. I desire
therefore this Author, when he writes next,
to tell us, what these Proportions were,
by which the Dutch gradually lessen'd their
Share, after the First Augmentation at a
Rate.

As to the Parliamentary Addresses to the Queen, that the States might be desir'd to observe their Proportions, I must tell this Writer, that whatever was done of this Kind, was upon general Rumours only, and not upon any Facts that appear'd before the House. Not in any thing more groundless, than the pretended Effect, he says, these Addresses had upon the States, that they eluded them by making their Troops Nominal Corps; as they did, by keeping up the Numbers of Regiments, but finding a Fifth Part of the Men and Money. This Author, after all the Pains taken by so many Emissaries, has very ill Intelligence, or else he had known, that there is not in all this one Syllable of Truth. The Dutch Corps are so far from being Nominal, that they are the completest in the whole Service. No Troops are so strictly muster'd, at least once in the Campaign; and every Captain is oblig'd, upon Pain of being broke, to have his Complement to a Man. And this is a Strictness observ'd in no other Troops, that I know of.

The next Complaint is against the Manner in which the Dutch Troops are employ'd; a Complaint as unjust and groundless as the former. He says, The more Towns we conquer, the worse Condition we are in, because they make no Scruple of employing the Troops of their Quota, towards garrisoning every Town, as fast as it is taken, directly contrary to the Agreement, by which Garrisons are excluded.

I wish

I wish this Author wou'd have given us the Words of this Agreement, and then I believe, we shou'd find the Garrisons excluded, mean the Garrisons of the Towns that at that time belong'd to them, and not the Towns that shou'd be taken in the Prosecution of the War; tho' had it been so express'd, it ought not in Equity to have been extended so far as this Author wou'd have it; nothing less being in their Thoughts, at the time of that Agreement, than that such a Number of strong Towns cou'd be forc'd from so powerful an Enemy, or that he shou'd suffer it, before he cou'd be brought to submit to a good Peace. These were Cases not foreseen; But this is a Defence the Dutch don't want; by the Wisdom and Conduct of my Lord M—, the Troops left in Garrison in Elba, during the Campaigns, are very inconsiderable. This Author's General, I know, cou'd think this Work enou for a whole Army. But his Grace knowz how to employ his Troops to better Purposes. What remain in Garrison are a Tribe compar'd to the whole Army; and generally such Regiments, as in the Campaign before have suffer'd so much, as not to be in a Condition to take the Field. I could indeed tell this Writer, of some English Regiments that have staid in Garrison, because they were too weak to take the Field, tho' the Service has not been the Occasion of their Weakness; but this I am sure he had rather not hear of.

As for the Towns that lie nearell to the Armies, they indeed have in them larger Garrisons; but yet, that if any Misfortune should

I wish

should happen, those who think now so many Troops are plac'd in them, wou'd complain loudly, that there were not more. But as to these Troops, it must be observ'd, that they are as useful to the Operations of the Campaign, as those that actually are in the Field; and often are upon much harder Duty, in securing Convoys of Provisions, Ammunition and Artillery, and in other secret and extraordinary Services. ¹⁰ Besides, that upon any Prospect of a general Action, Care is always taken, that the greatest Part of them should join the Army. And if this Author can bear the Name of *Brockhurst*, I would put him in mind, that it was a Body of Troops privately drawn from the Neighbouring Garrisons, that enable'd the Army this Summer to pass the *Senix*, and form that Siege, the Success of which has given so much Offence. 'Tis true indeed the *Dutch*, or rather this Lord *M*—, does put constantly Garrisons in every Town, *as fast as 'tis taken*. For Example, last Year he put 4 Garrisons in Towns, where the Allies have had none for these 30 or 40 Years before. And I would be glad to know, what Method this Author wou'd take; (not that I think him or his Friends very like to take Towns.) Wou'd he, when he has taken them, leave them without Garrisons, for the Enemy to retake? Or can he tell where to find Troops to put into them, *as fast as they are taken*, if he won't spare any from his Army? But to pass this Nonsense, our Author concludes this Complaint against the *Dutch*, with an Assertion the most ridiculously false and extravagant of any in the whole Book.

There are 22 Men in the *Regt* of Dragoons. There

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There is not in the World, I believe, such
another Book, nor in this Book such another
Proposition. This at length, says he, arrived
by several Steps to such a Height, that there are as
present in the Field, not so many Forces under the
Duke of M. Command in Flanders, as
Britain alone maintains for that Service, nor have
been for some Years past. This is such a foolish
ill-contriv'd Invention, that one wants a
Name for it. If it had not been intended
for some very short-liv'd Purpose, 'tis scarce
credible any Writer shou'd so far forget himself,
as not to have more Regard to Probability.
To shew him the monstrous Folly and
Absurdity of this Assertion, I must make a
little Use of Numbers; and to be as clear as
possible, I will make a Calculation upon
those he may be supposed to be best acquainted
with. In the Estimate of the 40, 000 Men
furnish'd by England, for the Service in Flan-
ders, 16 Batallions of Foot are computed to
be 14937 Men; and Five Regiments of Horse,
and Two of Dragoons, making in all 17
Squadrons, are reckon'd to be 3522; and the
Total of the Forces in Her Majesty's Pay for
Flanders, is 64724; and deducting the 2600
Palmiers, which, as I observ'd, are in Spain,
there remains only 62724. Now let us see, how
many Squadrons and Batallions this Number
will make, at the Rate the English Squadrons
and Batallions are reckon'd in the aforesaid
Estimate. Now if 16 Batallions make 14937
Men, then 12 Batallions make 11145; and if
7 Squadrons of Horse and Dragoons are
322 Men, then 68 Squadrons make 22088.
Add them together 48545, and 14038, and

the Total will be 62622; almost equal to all the *Flanders* Forces in Her Majesty's Pay.

These are all the Troops under the Duke of M----, that are paid by us, besides Two Battalions of the Foot Guards, which make about 1200 Effective Men. Let us now compare an Army, consisting of 52 Battalions, and 68 Squadrons, with the whole that is commanded by the D. of M----, which, if this Writer says true, must be less by one Squadron, or one Battalion at least; but if we look for the D. of M----'s Army in any *Line of Battel*, many of which are printed every Year in the common News-Papers, we shall find a great deal above twice that Number of Battalions, and more than thrice that Number of Squadrons. Now unless it can be prov'd, that 52 Battalions are more than about an Hundred and Twenty or Thirty, of which those 52 are a Part; and that 240 Squadrons are less than 68 of the same Squadrons, this Author must acknowledge, that the Total of the Queen's Forces, which he has affirm'd to be bigger than the D. of M----'s Army, is really not half so big; the Imperial Forces not included; tho' this Author don't except them, and in common Esteem they are consider'd as one Army. But perhaps these Troops had left *Flanders*, when this Passage was writ, which it seems to have been during the Campaign; tho' he had Reasons, he says, for not publishing sooner. For had a Man writ at a Season, when the Armies were out of the Field, he cou'd not have expressid himself so absurdly, as to say, there are not ~~not~~ present so many Forces in the Field. And blue

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that the next Paragraph, concerning the D.
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pears plainly to be stuck in, since the Book
was writ, having no Connection with what
goes before, or follows after. And from
hence I make this Reflection, That this Book
has been upon the Anvil, as long as the Cause
is to serve has been negotiating; and that
the blackest Arts were using to ruin the D.
of M., at the same time that we were told,
some Men profess'd the greatest Friendship
for him.

to come to this Complaint against the
Dutch, for not coming entirely into the Pro-
ject for Winter-Quarters: I observe, to the
Honour of the States, that this Author charges
them with no one Fact in all the Operations
of this War for Nine Years: That what he
do's charge them with, is no Breach of any
Treaty, unless this Author can prove that the
Dutch are bound to come into all the Projects
the General shall propose: That if they did
not come into this, 'twas not for the Reason
assign'd by him, when he says, the Question
was reduced to this short Issue, Whether the Dutch
should lose the poultry Benefit arising by Contributi-
ons, or the Common Cause an advantage of such
mighty Importance? In which I am confident
he speaks against his own Knowledge, since
'tis plain by his manner of expressing himself,
that he has seen the Papers relating to this Af-
fair; and that he can't have done, without
learning from them, that the States made se-
veral Objections to this Project: That to crowd
such a number of Troops into that Frontier;

would in many respects be very inconvenient to the Troops, and render them less fit for Service the next Campaign; That it would leave the Netherlands and their own Provinces too much expos'd; and that the extraordinary Expence for Bedding, Clothing, Firing, and other Incident Charges, was too great for them to bear, considering the prodigious Charges they were already at. But however, provided the Troops of the several Nations in that Service would furnish their part towards these Garrisons, and the Queen would come into a Proportion of the other Articles besides Forage, they would agree to it. This England did consent to, but not till it was too late to make the Necessary Preparations for the Reception and Subsistence of so many Troops; and so this Project, in part, was forc'd to be laid aside, tho' the best Care had been taken that the Execution of it might not be lost for want of Time; and to that end my Lord S--- came over hither with it in the beginning of July.

As to the Insinuation about the *poultry Benefit* of Contributions, this Author knows 'tis wholly groundless; that the States have sufficiently clear'd themselves in that Point, and shewn that the Treaty for Contributions was made before this Design was form'd: And that this Treaty did interfere but little with the Project, to hinder the Enemies erecting Magazines, since that Treaty only Stipulates, that the Product of those Countries under Contribution, shall pass free and unmolested: But the Product of those Countries was entirely eaten up by

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our Armies, and therefore the French Maga-
zines must be made of what is not the Product
of those Countries, and consequently are not
affected by the Treaty. This is the True State
of this Matter, and this Writer's *poultry Be-*
fit had no part in it; tho' a Benefit which at
other times he won't allow to be a poultry
one, but would make us think it amounts to
an immense Sum; and his Friends have been
often endeavouring to persuade the World,
that the D. of M. had a good share of it; at
the same time that they knew, 'tis by Treaty
allotted to the States, in consideration of the
Contributions they pay themselves, and of
that vast Expence they are at in Sieges; which
by the Success of the War, and the Loss of
Engineers exceeds greatly what had
been expected, or it could be imagined they
could bear. And after all, if it were true
that the States did not exert themselves as they
might have done on this Occasion, who can
blame them? With what Heart could they
go into an expensive Project for the War,
when they knew private Negotiations of
Peace, had been carrying on for several
Months? Or how could they expect that a
Project of such Importance, wholly form'd by
the Duke of M. and highly for his Honour,
wou'd be supported where he had no longer
any Credit.

But I must observe further in relation to
this Project; First, that it did not miscarry
under the Old M—y; which yet was ne-
cessary to prove our Author's Point, that
we suffer'd our Allies to do so and so. And
that the Project at last, tho' not in the
full

full Extent of it, has been so far comply'd with, as to enable us to hinder the Enemy from making a new Line, and cutting off *Bouchain*, as they design'd in their late Attempt; which, if it wou'd not lead me too far from my Subject, I cou'd give broad Suspicion's, that it was made in Concert, to forward the same good End this Book was writ for. And 'tis not a little Remarkable, that the News of it arriv'd the Day the R—t met after two Prorogations; and had the Letters come in that Morning as regularly they shou'd have done, it might have had a fatal Influence on the Resolutions, that then were to be taken. But this Attempt, God be thank-ed, has miscarry'd, and in the Circumstan-
ces we are now in, I am perswaded our Troops will be able to defeat any future Attempt that shall be made of the same Kind: And to take the Field so much sooner than the Enemy, that we may justly hope to have *Cambrey* or *Arras* very early in the next Year. After which there will neither be a Town or River of Consequence between us and *Paris*. It was therefore high time for the French to pro-
pose a Congres, and to make sure, e're 'twas too late, of *Spain* and the *West-Indies*.

The next Article of this Libel against the Dutch, is, that instead of making up in their Fle-
et what they fell short in their Army, they never once furnished their Quota either of Ships or Men. To this I answer, That they did not fall short of their Quota for the Army, but indeed exceed-ed it; as will appear by what has been already said, compared with the List of their Forces arm'd; by which we shall see they have

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their Pay about 142,385 Land-Men. And
 therefore there is no Obligation to make
 any Addition to their Fleet on that Account.
 But we are assur'd they never once furnished their
 Quota by Sea ; or if some few of their Ships now
 and then appear'd, it was no more than appearing,
 for they immediately separated to look to their Mer-
 chants, and protect their Trade : Which is a thing
 they are, it seems, very careful in ; and 'tis
 much for their Honour, and will enable them,
 who are so small a State, to hold out so ex-
 pensive a War much longer than they cou'd
 have done otherwise. If therefore this Au-
 thor is of a contrary Opinion, and thinks
 their Care of their Trade a Reproach to
 them ; I heartily wish it could be retorted
 upon us ; who 'tis certain have not been so
 careful ; as the Lords more than once have
 shewn in their Representations and Addresses to
 the Queen on this Subject. And 'tis not ar-
 bove a Twelvemonth since our *Virginiæ* Fleet
 was unaccountably lost upon our Coast, for
 want of a little Dutch Care. But to judge of
 this Matter more impartially, I desire this
 Author wou'd tell us, what it was we pro-
 pos'd to do with our Fleets, when we
 settled our Proportions at the beginning
 of the War ? Was it not chiefly, that
 we might be able to be a Match for the
 Enemy by Sea, as well as Land ? And have
 we not been so ? Has the Royal Fleet of
 France been able to shew it self these Seven
 Years ? Has not the Defeat near *Malaga* put
 out of their Power ever since to appear in
 line of Battel, either in the *Chanel*, or the
Mediterranean ? And have not the Dutch and
 the

we,

we, since that, done their Men of War ~~at~~ ⁱⁿ Town more Damage, than will be repair'd in many Years? Why then so much Complaint of their not furnishing their full Quota for the Sea-Service? Is it because it has hinder'd some Expeditions to the Indies? But if the Dutch had never so many Ships, I believe they woud find some other Use for them. They are too Frugal and Cautious a People to be fond of Expeditions, which cost so dear, and the Success of which is so uncertain, and depends on so many Accidents: and which when they succeed best, seldom fail to ruin both the Ships and Troops employ'd on those Services; and they will be confirm'd in this Opinion, by our late Expedition to Quebec. But I shall have occasion to say more of this in another Place.

But as if we might suffer greatly by the Failure of the Dutch in this Part, *We may very well remember*, says our Author, when those Guarantees of our Succession, after having not one Ship for many Months together in the Mediterranean, sent that Part of their Quota thither; and furnish'd nothing to us, at the same time that they alarm'd us with the Rumour of an Invasion. This Passage being an Insult on the Dutch, as Guarantees, by the Barrier-Treaty, of our Succession, should relate to something that happen'd since; and therefore can look no farther back than last Year. And if that be the Author's Meaning, there are few Passages in his Book more malicious. It having been upon Consideration of the Posture Affairs were in Spain, thought proper, that the English and Dutch Squadrons should continue all Winter in

in the Mediterranean, contrary to the usual Practice, the States sent Two Expresses over Land to Genoa, and I think one by Sea, with Instructions to their Admiral not to return. But these Expresses unfortunately missing him, he did return: Upon which they immediately order'd another Squadron to be fitted out. Now I desire this Author to tell me, if the States did not do all that cou'd be done in those Circumstances. But our Author says, they furnish'd nothing to us, at the same time that they alarm'd us with the Rumour of an Invasion. I remember indeed, we were alarm'd with such a Rumour, and that it gave great Offence; and that several Persons were not a little brow-beaten, for using their best Endeavours to give us the earliest Intelligence they cou'd. And because an Invasion was not actually attempted, and prov'd to be a Rumour only, 'twas presently laid to be a Plot of the Dutch, and the late M----y: And I wish we don't suffer another time, for discouraging the Intelligence we had then. We might, in my Humble Opinion, from the Intended Invasion in 1708. which was made then a Rumour, learn, that Advices in Matters of that Nature can't come too soon, nor the Persons employ'd be too diligent in giving Notice of the first Suspicions of such Designs. But the Dutch at that time sent their Ships to the Mediterranean, and furnish'd nothing to us. Here again, I wou'd ask this Author a Question or Two: First, Whether what the Dutch did, was not to promote the Service, and replace the Ships that were come away, contrary to their Intentions? Secondly, Whe-

ther the English M--y desir'd, that they would forbear a while to send those Ships away? And lastly, How he knows the Dutch would not have sent some Ships to our Assistance, had the Invasion prov'd more than a Rumour; which since it did not, there was no Occasion for their Help. But our Author has worse to say of the Dutch still. Sir J. Williams, it seems, met last Year with such a Reception, as ill became a Republick that lies under so many great Obligations to us. In short, such a one as these only deserve, who are content to take. Our Author's Resentments now run high; he seems to think we should demand Satisfaction; and it might, in Imitation of former Examples, were our Author Chief Minister, be made in due time Part of a Declaration for another Dutch War; which in several Places he seems to long for. But to the Point, if He had told us the Particulars of this Reception, he should have a more distinct Answer to it. At present, I must observe, that this is the first Complaint of this Kind in Ten Years. And then if Sir James did not succeed in his Busines, 'twas because the Dutch were neither able to do what was desir'd; neither did he come time enough for it; the State of the War both by Sea and Land for that Year, being fix'd before his Arrival. Which made it impossible for the Admiralty of Holland to comply with any new Propos'd. As for the States, they have always behav'd themselves with the utmost Respect to the Q--n, and a just REGARD to the Interest of Her People: And have, we all know, lately given the most

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sensible Proof of their profound Defiance to Her Majesty, in consenting to a Congress against their own, and the Judgments of their Allies; as is set forth in their Resolution upon that Subject. But since the Expence of so Executive and Long a War, is so great, that they are not able fully to answer all the Parts of it, a Deficiency must fall somewhere; and therefore they have very prudently let it fall on their Fleet, where it would be least felt. This is the true Answer to all this Author has said, or can lay against them, in relation to the Sea. They maintain above One Hundred and Forty Thousand Men at Land: And the State of the War, for one Year, comes to near Four Millions and a Half.

For Example. The General Estimate of their Expence for the War the last Year, was as follows:

Gild. Sr.
The Ordinary and Extraordi- nary Estimate of the War for 1710, amount to
1,441,503 17
The Troops which are not in either of those Estimates
4,000,000 00
The Extraordinary Expen- ces of the Campaign, ex- clusive of Artillery and Ammunition for Sieges; of which an exact Esti- mate can be made before- hand, but which must a- mount to a very conside- rable Sum,

	Gild.	St.
Money for Recruits of Men and Horses, &c. —	1,110000	00
Magazines of Forage, —	1,610000	00
For the Sea Service, above what arises from the Du- ties of Importation and Exportation, —	2,612980	00
Subsidies to several Allies, —	2,78623	6
In all —	45,167208	9

Which Sum at 11 Gilders to
the Pound Sterling, is — 4378837 1.

And that we may make the true Judg-
ment of the Expence the States are at from
this Estimate, I must desire the Reader to
take along with him these Three Remarks.

1. That the Revenue arising from the Places the Dutch are possess'd of in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, and of all the Places in the *Generality*, such as *Breda* and others, that are not properly a Part of the Seven Provinces, all this Revenue is appropriated to the Payment of Charges not within this Estimate.
2. That each of the Seven Provinces apart is at the Charge of all the Parts of its own Civil Government.
3. That there is not one of the Provinces that has not been obliged to borrow from time to time very great Sums to furnish their Contingent for the War; and consequently there is none of them that does not pay

Annua-

Gild.	St.
1,310000	00
1,610000	00
2,612980	00
1,786832	6
8,167208	9
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Annually a great deal for Interest : none of
which Money is reckon'd in this Estimate.

I shall, without saying more of this Esti-
mate leave it to the Consideration of this
worthy Author; let him compare the Re-
venue of the Two Nations with the Annual
Expence of each, and then affirm, if he can,
that the Weight of War does not in Pro-
portion lie heavier upon the *Dutch* than us ;
which till then, I shall take the Liberty to say
it does : Which is at once a full Answer to all
that has been or can be said against them.
And if they were capable of deserting their
Allies, and going into the Interest of *France*,
after so much Success against them, this Au-
thor has furnish'd them with better Argu-
ments, than any he has brought against them.
For if they have done all they can, and more than they can, which is true of
them : And if what this Writer every where
affirms of our Condition, is true of us, 'tis
time there shou'd be an end of all Complaints,
on each Side ; and that they shou'd be glad
of any Peace the *French* will vouchsafe to
give them.

Nor is the Expence of their Sieges, and
several other Considerable Articles, reckon'd
into this Account : And therefore consider-
ing how very small a Territory the Seven
Provinces together make ; that they subsist
almost entirely by Trade, and That is mostly
confin'd to one, which is not so big as some
Counties in *England* ; 'tis truly wonderful to
see the mighty Efforts they have made :
They have outdone the Expectation even of

the

the Enemy, & and I dare say the Faction in England are the only People in the World that think they have not done enough. To envy so Brave a People any little Branch of Expence they have lay'd, in order to be able to support the more necessary Parts of the War with Vigour, is as barbarous, as to quarrel with them, because they have not done more than they are able, is absurd and unreasonnable.

And the same Answer I must take leave to make to the next Complaint made against them, That they are always slow in paying their Subsidies. People can pay no further than they have Money to pay with. They take the most extraordinary Ways to raise Money, Ways, that we in England should be very loth to come to, and they are in Debt a great deal more than we, and have a less Revenue by much to answer it. 'Tis therefore not very strange, if their Payments of Subsidies be not so quick as they shou'd be. It is indeed very much for the Honour of the late M—y, that our Payments have hitherto been so regular; but I cannot see by what necessary Consequence the Slowness of the Dutch throws the Blame and Pressure on the Queen. If we are able to make quick Payments, we shou'd, whether the Dutch do or not; and whenever we can't, I dare say we shall not; which is their Case.

Our Author having thus far attack'd the Dutch, takes the late Emperor to task next; but what he has to say upon this and other Heads, and any other scatter'd Objections of his against his Mortal Enemies the Dutch, I

must

must leave to be consider'd in a *Third Part* ; this being already too big ; which I persuade my self every fair and candid Reader will forgive, when he considers that this Able Writer can crowd more false Things into one Page, than can sometimes be set right in Ten. I have nothing to add, but to desire the Reader, in Justice to our *Allies*, to make due Allowances for the many unavoidable Imperfections in this Defence of them, which they are much abler to do themselves ; and I am persuaded, if we had a good Minister from *Holland*, or Count *Gallas* were still here, neither the *States*, nor the House of *Austria*, woud' want to be defended by an English Pen.

A LIST

To acquaint you with
what we now call
expect to find themselves
in the following

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107
Morse 4128
Drag. 992
Pot 46889

46,009

orse 4501.
rag. 1592.
ot 28899.

44,990.

orse 1440.
3g. 771.
ot 15232.

17494

A LIST of the Troops the
State of the United Provinces
kept in their Service at the Peace
of Ryswyk, and of the Aug-
mentations made since that Time
to the Year 1711.

Horse 4228.

Drag. 992.

Foot 40889.

46,009.

Horse 4501.

Drag. 1592.

Foot 38899.

44,992.

Horse 1440.

Drag. 771.

Foot 15282.

17,494.

THE State of the United Provinces kept
in their Service, at the
Peace of Ryswyk, 46,009
Men, both Horse and Foot,
which, at the Return of
the Guards from England,
suffer'd some small Altera-
tion, both in the Propor-
tion between the Horse
and Foot, and in the Num-
ber; but without any Di-
minution of the Expence;
so that at the Death of K.
Charles II. of Spain, the
State paid

44,992.

At the Beginning of
the Year 1701. the State
augmented their Troops
by way of Recruits, with

17,494.

And

Horse 4188.	And raised at the same
Foot 10842.	Time, 72 Companies of
	Horse, and 163 of Foot,
15039.	making together
Drag. 304.	And by two Capitula-
Foot 792.	tions of the 12th of April,
1096.	and 27th of May, 2 Squa-
	drons of Dragoons, and
	1 Regiment of Foot, ma-
	king together
Drag. 528.	Not contented with
Foot 1680.	that, the State took into
	their Service, by two Con-
2208.	tracts of the 10th of March,
	and 18th of April, 2 Re-
	giments of Foot, and 2 of
	Dragoons of Anspach, ma-
	king
Drag. 492.	Again, by a Contract of
	the 27th of March, 2 Re-
	giments of Foot of Meck-
	lenberg, making
400.	
1600.	
2000.	
Horse 1872.	Again, by a Contract
Drag. 552.	of the 2nd of April, 1888,
Foot 4452.	Regiments of Horse, 1 of
	Dragoons, and 6 of Foot
6876.	of Hanover and Zell, ma-
	king
874.	
4255.	
5129.	

Se 1488. By a Contract of the 27th of May, 4 Regiments of Horse, and as many of Foot of the Elector Pal-

4656. time, making 4656.

3000. Thereafter the State ne-
1000. gotiated together with
8000. Great Britain, by the Tre-
12000. ty of the 15th of June,
12000. 12000 Danoes, the Half of
which makes 6000.

492. The same Year the
1246. State augmented again
their Troops with 6 Com-
1728. panies of Foot of Hesse-
Cassel, and 7 Companies
of Switzers, making 1738.

400. And by a Contract of
1600. the 17th of October, with
2000. 1 Regiment of Horse, and
2 of Foot of Munster, ma-
king 2000.

N. B. The said 2000
Men arrived but at the end
of August, the following
Year.

874. Great Britain and the
4255. State have by Contract of
5129. the 30th of December, 1701.
taken into their Service 2
Regiments of Horse and 5
of Foot of the King of
I 2 Prus-

to Prussia's, making 7129
Men, the States Moiety
comes to

2564

Horse 3600. Moreover by a Con-
Drag. 1280. tract of the 7th of Februa-
Foot 4360. ry, 1702. 1 Regiment of
Horse, 2 of Dragoons,
6000, and 5 of Foot, of Hesse-
Cassel, making 6000 Men,
to which the Landgrave
engaged to join 2000 for
a Subsidy; the Half of the
6000 makes

Horse 520. The two Powers made
Drag. 2589. in the Spring of the fol-
Foot 16902. lowing Year, 1703. an
Augmentation of 20000
Men, the List of which is
to be found in the Con-
tract of the 20th of August.
The States Moiety makes 10,000

Drag. 600. In the Year 1704. the
Foot 3400. State took into their Ser-
vice, by a Contract of the
4000. 21st of March, 1 Regiment
of Dragoons and 2 of Foot,
of Würtemberg, making - - -

4000

Horse 720. Beside, in the Year
Foot 480. 1706. they took, toge-
ther with Great Britain, by
1200. a Contract of the 25th of
May, 2 Regiments of Horse
and a Battalion of Hessians,
with

with which their Body of
9000 Men was augmented.
The States Share is —————

Horse 464. And by the Contract
Foot 2536. of the 26th of the same
Month, together with
3000 Great Britain, 3000 Pal-
estines. The States Third
Part is ————— 2000.

In the Beginning of the
Year 1707. the State aug-
mented the National Horse
with 8 Men in each Com-
pany, amounting to —————

Horse 443. Great Britain and the
Foot 896. State took into their Ser-
vice, by a Contract of the
20th of April of the same
Year, 4639 Saxons, the
Share of the States comes
to ————— 2319.

Again, by the Contract
of the 27th of August of
the same Year, one Regi-
ment of Dragoons of 800
Men. The States Half is
400.

The State took besides
into their Service, by a
Contract of the 21st of
February 1709/10. Regi-
ments of Foot of Holsteins
by itself, making ————— 1400.
And

Horse 264.
Drag. 528.
Foot 3300.

4092.

And by a Contract of
the 22d of March in the
same Year, together with
Great Britain, 4092 Seasons.
The States Share amounts
to

2046.

Moreover, by that of
the same Month, one Re-
giment of Foot of Holstein
Gottorp, of

797.

And by that of the 18th
of April, one of Munster of

800.

The State did at the
same time augment the
Swiss and Grisons Regiments
with 22 Men in each
Company, making

1144.

Lastly, the State agreed
the 29th of June, 1711, for
2 Swiss Regiment of 1200
Men, the raising of which
is in a good Forwardness,

1200.

Tis observable, that all
the Troops mention'd in
this List, receive the or-
dinary Pay of the State,
and many of them still
more, one Holstein Regi-
ment of Horse excepted;
whereas Great Britain has
allowed theirs, besides such
one

138,200

(71)

one Regiment of the *Landgrave's*, a Body of 10000 *Hannoverians*, and another of 6000 *Prussians*, a much lower Pay; so that they only supply their Wants by the means of the Winter Quarters they have yearly in the flat Country.

'Tis to be observ'd again, that besides all the fore-mention'd Troops, the State pays since the Year 1706. together with Her *Britannick* Majesty, the Bread, Forage, and Agio of the Money, at 25 per 100 for a Body of 10370 *Prussians*; and that this Payment does, in relation to the State, come so much the nearer to the ordinary Pay, because a great Part of that Body has every Year its Winter Quarters in the flat Country of the State, which prevents getting the Taxes, which otherways might be laid upon it; so that it seems there are good Grounds for inserting in the List of the Troops the State pays, one Half of that Body, which is

5185.

Total 143,385

F I N I S.

2046.

797.

808.

1144.

1200.

128,200

John 3:1-18

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it is impossible to find
it with the same exactness
~~as in the former~~

THE following List having
been sent since the First Edi-
tion of this Paper; It was thought
proper to be added now, that the
Reader may see at one View the
whole Forces in the Pay of Her
Majesty and the States, that have
fought this War in Flanders. And
as he observes a small Difference in
the Sums Total of the Dutch For-
ces, in this and the foregoing List,
as it is not very material; so he
will find the Reason of it, by com-
paring the Two Lists together.

LIST of the Troops in the Pay of
States-General, that have
been Employed in the
Countries during the pre-
sent War.

TROOPS in the States Pay.

TRO

1701, and 1702.

Number

When the States requir'd the Assistance of 10,000 Men stip-
ulated to be given them in case of an Invasion from France, the Troops
the States had then on Foot amounted to

44,99

And they immediately increas'd them the same Year by augmenting the Numbers of the respective Troops and Companies then on Foot, as follows:

Horse 3440

Drag. 772

Foot 15,252

They rais'd at the same time 72 Troops of Horse, most of their Regiments after the Peace being reduc'd to 3 Troops each, and by this means were compleat'd again to 6 Troops, making 4188

They likewise rais'd then 162 Companies to fill up their Regiments of Foot, making 10,842

15,000

Majesty's Pay

Rais

in the Pay of Her Majesty and the
at have been Employ'd in the Low-
the present War.

Pay.

TROOPS in Her Majesty's Pay.

1701, and 1702.

Number	Numbers
At the Beginning of the Year 1701, the late King, pursuant to a Treaty with the States-General, in case of their being invaded by France, sent to their Assistance Twelve Battalions of Foot, making	10,000
Which Body of Men was afterwards augmented by four Battalions of Foot, five Regiments of Horse, and Two Regiments of Dragoons, making	8459
The same Year, by several Conventions with the Kings of Denmark and Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, and the Landgrave of Hesse, pursuant to a Resolution of the House of Commons for making up the 10,000 to 40,000 Men, there was taken into Her Majesty's Pay, —	21,612
Rais	40,000

TROOPS in the States Pay.

Rais'd more 2 Squadrons of Numbers
Dragoons, and a Battalion
of Foot, making 1096
They took in their Pay 2 Regi-
ments of Foot, and 1 Regi-
ment of Dragoons of An-
spach, 2298
More 2 Regiments of Foot of
Mecklenbourg, 1680
More 4 Regiments of Horse,
1 of Dragoons, and 6 of Foot,
of Hannover and Celle, 6876
More of Hesse-Cassel Foot — 2000
More from the Elector Palatine 4656
More the Moiety with England
of 12000 Danes, 6000
More Hessians and Swiss 1738
More 1 Regiment of Horse,
and 2 of Foot of Munster, + 2000
More the Moiety with Eng-
land of 5129 Prussians, 2564
More the Moiety with Eng-
land of 6000 Hessians, 3000
111,33

1703.

They augmented their Troops
in Concert with England by
10,000 Men, which are par-
ticularly mention'd in the Con-
vention of the 30th of Aug. 10,000

1706.

More One Third of 3000 Pa-
latines by Convention, dated
the 26th of May, 10,000

Carry'd forward 122,33

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Men Aug-
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the States
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3000 Pa-
Majesty
Date 26

4639 S
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August, th

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Siege, an
Dec. left
Low-Coun

(177)

TROOPS in Her Majesty's Pay.

Brought forward — 40,000

1703.

This Year, by Convention between the Queen and the States, Twenty Thousand Men Augmentation were taken into Her Majesty's and the States Joint Pay, Her Majesty's Moiety being — 10,000

1706.

This Year Her Majesty and the States took into their Pay 3000 Palatines, wherof Her Majesty by Treaty bearing Date 26 May, pays Two Thirds, 2000

1707.

4629 Saxons were taken this Year into Her Majesty's and the States Pay by Convention bearing date April 20. the Moiety whereof makes 2219

The Hanover Regiment of Bothmar's Dragoons was taken into the Queen's and the States Joint-Pay by Treaty dated 27 August, the Moiety whereof is 400

1708. — 2719

Towards the End of this Year, during the Siege of Lise, Gen. Erle came with 11 English Battalions to offend to favour that Siege, and upon his Return in Dec. left 5 of those Batt. in the Low-Countries, making about 4500

Carry'd forward 5919

TROOPS in the States Pay.

Brought forward 122,334

1707.

They Recruited their own

Horse by Eight Men in a

Troop, making 1160

In Conjunction with England

they took into their Pay the

Moity of 4629 Saxons by

Treaty of the 30th of April, 2319

In Conjunction with England,

they took the Moity of Both-

mar's Dragoons into their

Pay, according to a Treaty

of the 27th of August, 400

1709. 4879

They brought to the Low Coun-

tries into their Pay a Regi-

ment of Dragoons, and 3

Regiments of Foot of Wir-

temberg, to whom they only

allow'd Bread before in Ger-

many, making 4000

They took into their Pay 2 Reg.

of Foot of Wolfenbuttel, 1400

More the Moity with England

of an Augmentation of 4092

Saxons, by a Treaty of the

20th of March, 2046

More a Reg. of Foot of Holstein, 797

More a Reg. of Foot of Munster, 800

They augmented their Regi-

ments of Swiss and Grisons by 1144 10,187

136,400

Mem. In June 1711. the States made

a Capitulation for a new Reg. of Swiss

of 1200 Men, which is near compleat.

137,600

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the Saxon

Engl. & H

4092, wh

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Majesty's

Germany,

Flanders, if

Pay,
1 122,334

(79)

TROOPS in Her Majesty's Pay.
Brought forward — 59,219

I 7 0 9.

By Treaty dated *March 22*,
the *Saxon* Troops in the Pay of
Engl. & Holl. were augmented by
4092, whereof the Moiety is 2046

By Treaty dated *12 April*,
Her Majesty took into Her
Service a Body of *Prussian*
Troops, consisting of — 6225

By Convention of *July 10*,
Her Majesty took into Her Pay
a Battalion of the *Elector of
Treves*, consisting of — 700

— 8975

I 7 1 0.

By Treaty with *K. Augustus*,
dated *May 30*, Her Maj. took in-
to Her Pay 2 *Saxon* Bat. to com-
plete the 10,000 Men wanting
the last Year, consisting of — 1548

I 7 1 1.

Her Maj. sent over a Reg. of
Drag. command. by *Col. Kerr*, of — 450

— 70,188

Mem. This Year Her Majesty took into Her
Pay a Battalion of the *Prince of Ottingen*, con-
sisting of 660 Men, to serve as Part of Her
Majesty's *Quota* of the Corps of Neutrality in
Germany; but by the Treaty is to serve in
Flanders, if requir'd.

137,600

1990-1991
University of Wyoming

Note. That the Old Corps of about 11,000 Prussians, and the Hessians Troops, for which Her Majesty and the States pay only Subsidies, or Bread *Agio*, and Forage, are not included in this List of either Side.

The Number of the English Foot in Flanders have been different from time to time. There are ~~45~~ Battalions included in the foregoing List, tho' there be at present but Twenty Two in the *Low-Countries*; and Five Battalions were order'd from thence the beginning of the Year, for the Expedition with Mr. Hill.

the last year consulting to
please the 10,000 men working
on the Bay & Swan River copper
mines in Manitoba, & the
Government of Canada.

